Enterprise computer investigation system

ABSTRACT

A method, apparatus and system for secure forensic investigation of a target machine by a client machine over a communications network. In one aspect the method comprises establishing secure communication with a server over a communications network, establishing secure communication with the target machine over the communications network, wherein establishing secure communication with the target machine includes establishing secure communication between the server and the target machine, installing a servelet on the target machine, transmitting a secure command to the servelet over the communications network, executing the secure command in the servelet, transmitting data, by the target machine, in response to a servelet instruction, and receiving the data from the target machine over the communication network.

BACKGROUND

1. Field

The present invention relates to computer investigation systems, andmore specifically, to secure computer forensic investigations in anetwork.

2. Background

Computer investigation has become increasingly important as the use ofcomputers has extended to virtually all areas of everyday life. Computerinvestigation, as used herein, includes computer forensics, which is thecollection, preservation and analysis of computer-related evidence.Computer-related evidence is increasingly being used for court trialsand police investigations. Computer evidence may be relevant in criminalor civil matters.

One tool for computer forensic investigation is software used to performthe computer forensic investigation. Electronic evidence may be alteredor erased without proper handing. For example, merely booting a targetcomputer into its native Windows environment will alter critical datestamps, erase temporary data, and cause data to be written to a harddisk drive or other storage device, thereby possibly destroying oraltering data on the storage device. It is desirable in forensic systemsto be minimally invasive and prevent unintended changes of the data—onthe storage device. Accordingly, it is desirable that computer forensicsoftware minimize the alteration of data during the acquisition processand that it further minimize any such alteration by other programs.

As an example of forensic investigation, a target storage device may benon-invasively examined by creating a bit-stream image, or “exactsnapshot,” of the target storage device on another external media, suchas floppy or zip disk, thereby creating an image or working copy of thetarget storage device.

Once the image copy is created, computer forensic software may mount theimage of the target storage device as a read-only drive, thus allowingthe investigator to conduct the examination on the image of the targetdrive without altering the contents of the original. This process ofmaking a copy image of the storage device, before examining the storagedevice, may preserve computer files without altering date stamps orother information. The process of non-invasively examining the storagedevice may also be accomplished through a preview process where thecomputer is booted to DOS and then connected to the investigator'scomputer, for example, through a parallel port cable.

Computer forensic analysis software may enable the efficient management,analysis and searching of large volumes of computer data by being ableto view and analyze, for example, such storage devices such as diskdrives at the disk level without having to go through, for example,intermediate operating system software. Forensic analysis scriptingtools may be used to target and automate analysis of large volumes ofcomputer data. Accordingly, computer forensics analysis software may bean advantageous tool for related but non-forensic investigationpurposes, such as computer auditing and information assurance.

Current computer forensics analysis tools commonly work either from animage copy of a storage device, or over a link coupled between theparallel ports of the analyzing computer and the target computer.Commonly used, non-forensic, methods of searching, reviewing, andcopying logical files over a network may have a shortcoming in that timestamps and existing data may be altered or destroyed in the process.

Viewing computer files presents additional problems when used in anetwork setting. A remote administrator may access a node on a networkand access all of the files on the node's hard drive. However, when theremote administrator opens and accesses a file, the time stamp of thefile may change, and a temporary copy of the file may be created on thenode's hard drive as well as link files and other data. It is desirablefor forensic investigations to maintain the time stamps, and to avoidcreating various temporary files, which may overwrite other data. Eventhough a remote administrator can commonly access files, a remoteadministrator may be unable to access such items as swap files, deletedfiles, file slack, or printer spooler files. File slack is the datalocated from the end of the logical file to the end of the physicalstorage allocation on a storage device and may contain informationpreviously written to the storage device. Additionally, a storagedevice, such as a hard drive, may have dissimilar partitions, forexample, fat and ext 2, to operate with two different operating systems.In such a case a remote administrator may only be able to see and accessthe partition which corresponds to the remote administrator's operatingsystem. Additionally, a search done by the remote administrator may beslower than a search carried out by software resident on that node.Remote access over a computer network also provides additionalopportunities for abuse, such as unauthorized inspection.

Accordingly, there is a need for methods and systems for performingsecure computer forensics investigations over a computer network.

SUMMARY

An embodiment of the present invention is directed to the computerinvestigation of target machines connected to a network and security andauthentication protocols that enable computer investigations to takeplace in a secure environment.

In one aspect of the present invention, a method of examining a storagedevice coupled to a target machine in a communications network isdisclosed. The method includes installing a servelet on the targetmachine, commanding the servelet over the communications network toretrieve data from the storage device, using the servelet to retrievedata from the storage device, receiving data from the servelet over thecommunications network, and storing the retrieved data on a clientmachine.

In another aspect of the present invention, a machine coupled to astorage device and coupled to a network is disclosed. The machineincludes a processing unit and a servelet, the servelet includingcomputer code that executes on the processing unit, the code comprising:code that receives a command to read a portion of the storage device,code that reads the storage device according to the command received,and code that sends data from the reading of the storage device to aclient machine.

In yet another aspect of the present invention, a method for secureforensic investigation of a target machine by a client machine over acommunications network is disclosed. The method includes establishingsecure communication with a server over a communications network,establishing secure communication with the target machine over thecommunications network, wherein establishing secure communication withthe target machine includes establishing secure communication betweenthe server and the target machine, installing a servelet on the targetmachine, transmitting a secure command to the servelet over thecommunications network, executing the secure command in the servelet,transmitting data, by the target machine, in response to a serveletinstruction, and receiving the data from the target machine over thecommunication network.

In yet another aspect of the present invention, a system for secureforensic investigation over a communication network is disclosed. Thesystem includes a target machine coupled to the communication network,the target machine coupled to a storage device, a client machine coupledto the communications network, the client machine configured toinvestigate the target machine over the communications network, and anintermediate node coupled to the communications network, wherein theintermediate node is configured to facilitate secure communicationbetween the client machine and the target machine over thecommunications network.

In yet another aspect of the present invention, an apparatus for secureforensic investigation of a target machine by a client machine over acommunications network is disclosed. The apparatus includes means forestablishing secure communication with a server over a communicationsnetwork, means for establishing secure communication with the targetmachine over the communications network, wherein establishing securecommunication with the target machine includes means for establishingsecure communication between the server and the target machine, meansfor installing a servelet on the target machine, means for transmittinga secure command to the servelet over the communications network, meansfor executing the secure command in the servelet, means for transmittingdata, by the target machine, in response to a servelet instruction, andmeans for receiving the data from the target machine over thecommunication network.

It is understood that other aspects of the present invention will becomereadily apparent to those skilled in the art from the following detaileddescription, wherein is shown and described only exemplary embodimentsof the invention, simply by way of illustration. As will be realized,the invention is capable of other and different embodiments, and itsseveral details are capable of modifications in various respects, allwithout departing from the invention. Accordingly, the drawings anddescription are to be regarded as illustrative in nature, and not asrestrictive.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Aspects of the present invention are illustrated by way of example, andnot by way of limitation, in the accompanying drawings in which likereference numerals refer to similar elements throughout:

FIG. 1A is a graphical illustration of an environment in whichembodiments of the present invention may operate.

FIG. 1B is a graphical illustration of an exemplary topology for anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a graphic illustration depicting the examination of a targetmachine by a client machine over a network.

FIG. 3 is a graphic illustration of file slack that may be of interestin a forensic investigation.

FIG. 4 is a graphic illustration of a servelet running on a targetmachine, according to an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating a keyword search according to anembodiment of the invention.

FIG. 6A is a flow diagram of a computer investigation system setup inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 6B is a flow diagram of a computer investigation system inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 6C is a graphical illustration of a system embodying a forensicexamination security protocol, according to an embodiment of theinvention

FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram of a setup process for machines used in thecomputer investigation in accordance with an embodiment of theinvention.

FIG. 8 is a sequence diagram for establishing a secure system ofcommunication between an auditor machine and a server in accordance withan embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 9 is a sequence diagram for establishing a secure system ofcommunication between the server and a target machine in accordance withan embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram for establishing a secure system ofcommunications between an auditor machine and the target machine inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention.

FIG. 11 is a sequence diagram for secure communication between theauditor machine and the target machine in accordance with an embodimentof the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The detailed description set forth below in connection with the appendeddrawings is intended as a description of exemplary embodiments of thepresent invention and is not intended to represent the only embodimentsin which the present invention can be practiced. The term “exemplary”used throughout this description means “serving as an example, instance,or illustration,” and should not necessarily be construed as preferredor advantageous over other embodiments. The detailed descriptionincludes specific details for the purpose of providing a thoroughunderstanding of the present invention. However, it will be apparent tothose skilled in the art that the present invention may be practicedwithout these specific details. In some instances, well known structuresand devices are shown in block diagram form in order to betterillustrate the concepts of the present invention.

Various aspects of the inventive concepts herein will be described inthe context of a computer network, however, those skilled in the artwill appreciate that secure computer investigation is likewise suitablefor use in various other communications environments. Accordingly, anyreference to a computer network is intended only to illustrate theinventive aspects of the present invention, with the understanding thatsuch inventive aspects have a wide range of applications.

FIG. 1A is a graphical illustration of an environment in whichembodiments of the present invention may operate. In FIG. 1A a computernetwork is shown generally at 10. FIG. 1A illustrates computerworkstations 14A, 14B and 14C, which are coupled to server 12 via anEthernet coupling 16. The network may comprise any number ofworkstations and servers. Additionally, the Ethernet coupling 16 may bereplaced by other couplings well known in the art.

FIG. 1B is a graphic illustration of an embodiment of the inventioninstalled on an exemplary computer network. The exemplary environmentillustrated at 101 may be a computer network, such as the Internet, awide area network (WAN), a local area net (LAN), or other networkenvironment. For the purposes of the present disclosure a network may bedefined as any communications scheme able to connect multiple machines,in addition to the traditional notion of a network. The network 103includes a plurality of machines coupled to the network 103 over datacommunications links 105. The machines may be servers, work stations,personal computers, or other devices connected to the network by thedata communications links 105. Link 105 may be any network link known inthe art, for example, an Ethernet coupling. Vendor 107 is a provider ofcomputer investigation software 109 that is used for the operation of acomputer investigation system on network 101. Computer investigationsoftware 109, which is used to establish a secure investigational linkand to facilitate secure communication between a client machine 115 anda target machine 117, is installed by the vendor 107 on a server 111.The investigation software may be installed on any machine on thenetwork 101, here server 111 is exemplarily chosen. The machine on whichthe investigation software 109 is installed is commonly located at aphysically secure location, to help prevent it from being easilycompromised. The computer investigation software 109 may be installedlocally or over the network 103.

Keymaster 113 is commonly a trusted network administrator or otherequivalently trusted individual. A client machine 115 investigates andretrieves data from the target machine 117 over the network 103. Clientsoftware 116 operates on the client machine 115. The target machine 117is exemplarily the subject of the forensic computer investigation. Aservelet 118 is installed on the target machine 117. Computer data,software objects, or data packages are sent over the network usingstandard communication protocols, such as TCP/IP, SOCKS, IPX/SPX, orother suitable communication protocols. Machines communicate with othermachines on the network by way of the software operating on each of themachines in conjunction with hardware components of the machine.

There are exemplarily two different ways that a target machine 117 onnetwork 103 can be investigated. The first type of investigation is adirect investigation of the target machine 117. In such an investigationthe target machine 117 is examined directly. Such an examination may beaccomplished, for example, by making a disk image of a hard disk on thetarget machine 117 or in some manner directly coupling to the targetmachine 117 for the purposes of investigation.

A second method of investigating a target machine 117 is to investigatethe target machine 117 remotely, for example, over a network 103. Suchan investigation may be assisted by remote forensic examination tools.An illustrative example of such an investigation is depicted in FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 is a graphic illustration depicting the examination of a targetmachine 117 by a client machine 115 over a network 103. Such anexamination may be assisted by various embodiments of the inventionwhich provides tools for remote forensic examinations.

In an illustrative embodiment of the invention Client machine 115examines a network node 201. The network node 201 comprises a targetmachine having two hard disks, e.g. 205A and 205B. The client machine115 may investigate the hard drives 205A and 205B on target machine 117.One method of accomplishing such examination makes use of the fact thatthe target machine 117 will commonly be running some type of operatingsystem. The operating system running on target machine 117 commonly willhave a file system associated with it as a part of the operating system.Accordingly, the target machine may have a file system(s) mounted on theone or more disks 205A or 205B. In some operating systems the clientmachine 115 can assume an administrator-type mode and get a Windows™Explorer-type view of the file system which is mounted on target machine117. Such a view may be obtained without the operator of the targetmachine 117 being aware that such a view is being obtained.

One difficulty with the use of a resident operating system for aforensic examination is that the client machine 115 will commonlyoperate in an administrative mode such that, as soon as the clientmachine 115 opens a document on the target machine 117, a time stamp onthe document may change. Additionally, a temporary file and/or a swapfile may be created to accompany the open document. Accordingly, suchchanges on the target machine 117 may not be desirable from a forensicinspection standpoint. Additionally, if disk 205A contains one operatingsystem and disk 205B contains another file or operating system that isnot recognized by the operating system of disk 205A, the client machine115 may not be able to read both file systems. Such may be the case evenif there is only one disk and the disk is partitioned for multipleoperating systems. The client machine 115 may also have no visibilityinto files which have been deleted from the target machine. For thepurposes of forensic investigation, the files that have been deleted maybe of importance. An additional difficulty, which may be encountered, isin viewing file slack, as illustrated in FIG. 3.

FIG. 3 is a graphic illustration of file slack that may be of interestin a forensic investigation. In a Windows™ operating system, files arestored in clusters of multiples of 512 bytes. Accordingly, if a file is513 bytes long it will occupy two clusters, as will a file that is 1,024bites long. In the illustration in FIG. 3, a memo 301 is created. Thememo 301 is then saved and mapped on to cluster 303A. At a time laterthe file 301 is edited to form file 305. When file 305 is mapped cluster303 it appears as shown at 303B. In other words, the contents of file305 is mapped on cluster 303 as shown in 303B but since the file 305 isshorter than file 301, file 305 takes up less of the 303 cluster thandoes file 301. Accordingly, the remnant 307 of file 301 is still presenton cluster 303 as shown at 303B. The remnant of file 301 that remains incluster 303B is called file slack and is illustrated at 307. File slackmay show portions of previous files, which had been stored on thecluster before the storage of the current file. Such slack may be ofgreat interest in computer forensic investigation, for example to seeportions of previous versions of a file. File slack however may beinvisible to simple file viewing utilities. Such file slack, which isdefined as the area between the end of the logical file currentlyoccupying a cluster and the actual end of the physical cluster, maycontain remnants of multiple previously stored files and may containvaluable data in computer forensic investigations. Such file slack maybe viewed by looking at the physical disk cluster and examining all theclusters regardless of the file size of the logical file written onthem.

FIG. 4 is a graphic illustration of a servelet running on a targetmachine, according to an embodiment of the invention. In FIG. 4, theservelet 403 is running on target machine 117. In the present embodimentthe servelet is limited to an ability to accept commands to read sectorsfrom a storage device, exemplarily a physical hard drive, and report thesector data present. A sector map representing the contiguous storage onthe exemplary hard disk 205A is illustrated at 401. The servelet 403,though limited to minimal capability in the present example, may beendowed with any number of capabilities, as will be readily apparent tothose skilled in the art. In the present embodiment however, theservelet has limited capability, and accordingly small size. Theservelet 403 uses simple disk access commands to service requests fromthe client machine 115. The servelet 403 is actually used to view thephysical disk structures of the disk sector map 401. Accordingly, clientmachine 115 can send a get sector command to servelet 403. Servelet 403can then reply by reading the physical structure of the disk andreturning the sectors requested. Commonly a client machine 115 may firstcommand servelet 403 to read sector 0, thereby obtaining a map of thefile structure of the disk 205A. Sector 0 commonly contains thepartition data for the disk 205A. Once the client machine 115 has thepartition data for the disk, the client machine 115 may examine logicalfiles on the disk 205A or may examine the disk 205A according to thedata written on each sector of the physical hard drive, i.e., accordingto the sector map 401. By comparing a logical file and its mapping onthe hard disk 205A, file slack can be readily identified by the clientmachine 115. Such a mechanism is not limited to hard drives and may beused to examine any storage device located on the target machine 117.Additionally, the client machine 115 can determine the file structure,even of multiple operating systems, on the target machine 117.Therefore, the client machine 115 may be able to read not only the filespresent on disk 205A but also may be able to read such normallyinvisible items as deleted files, and file slack. Accordingly, by usingthe simple get sector command present in the servelet 403, the clientmachine 115 may examine all structures present on the disk 205A. In sucha manner, the client machine 115 may recreate either an exact image ofthe physical hard drive, such as section map 401, or an equivalent filestructure that exists on disk 205A, or both.

In one embodiment of the invention the client machine 115 will havemounted a series of folders and files locally which are copies of thosepresent on the target machine 117. The client will then know the filenames and the file extents. File extents are a list of the series ofsectors which comprise a logical file. Accordingly, an extent table 405may be constructed. In the exemplary extent table 405, a file begins atsector 2 and continues for 20 sectors, then jumps to sector 78 andcontinues for 12 sectors, then jumps to sector 106 and continues for 8sectors. Once an extent table for a file is discerned, then searches,for example a keyword search, may be facilitated. Such a keyword searchis illustrated in FIG. 5.

FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating a keyword search according to anembodiment of the invention. In FIG. 5 the keyword search is initiatedin block 501. In block 501 the file structure and extent tables forfiles are determined as previously described. As an example, keywordsare to be searched in a file represented by extent table 405. In block503, the keywords are sent to the servelet 403. In the presentillustrative embodiment, the servelet 403 is equipped with theadditional ability of being able to look for and identify keywords. Inblock 505 the client machine 115 then sends the file extents, accordingto the exemplary extent table 405, to the servelet. The client machine115 may send all or part of the extent table depending on how theservelet software has been constructed. So if a keyword is to besearched for, in a file the servelet does not have to blindly searchthrough the disk map 401, it may instead search the sectors and countsin the extent table. Once the servelet has completed the search, it maysend back the location of the hits, i.e., matches of the keywords andwhere they are located in a particular sector. By doing so, the trafficacross the network is minimized over a case, for example, in whichsectors are simply sent from the servelet to the client machine 115.Once the hits for keyword matches are received by the client machine115, as depicted in block 506, the client machine 115 can decide whichsectors it wishes to examine and can send commands to the servelet toget sectors of the disk 205A as illustrated at block 507. By proceedingin such a manner, the amount of network traffic to and from the targetmachine 117 can be minimized. Additionally, much of the searching takesplace right on the target machine 117, therefore speeding that process.Accordingly, the information regarding the keyword hits is onlycommunicated to the client machine 115, instead of having to communicatethe entire file to the client machine 115 and then searching for thekeywords on the client 115. Using such a methodology files on the targetmachine can be examined and searched without having to open the file, gothrough an operating system, change file stamps, create backup files, orperform other actions that were required if the file would be searchedusing operating system utilities. In addition, file permissions on thetarget machine 117 can be bypassed using this methodology.

The same methodology can be used in order to take digital fingerprintsof files on the target machine 117. That is, the servelet 403 may havethe software to compute a digital signature for files such as, forexample, a CRC (cyclic redundancy check) or other digital fingerprintwell known in the art. In that way when a target machine is beingexamined certain files can be identified readily and can be examined foralterations. For example, certain types of hacker tools used to alterfiles may be used on the target machine 117. The presence of such filescan be determined by having the servelet examine files for digitalfingerprints of the common hacker tools. Even if such hacker tools areerased, portions of the tools may remain in deleted files or withinslack space. In such a way, the types of files present on a targetmachine 117 can be examined. Further, types of files can be identifiedon the target machine 117 in order to be ignored. That is, the clientmachine 117 may not be interested in programs, such as word processors,spreadsheets, etc. present on the target machine 117, and can eliminatethose from scrutiny by having the servelet identify their digitalfingerprints, and hence their location on the storage device.

FIG. 6A is a flow diagram of a computer investigation system setup inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention. In step 601, a handshakeauthentication occurs between the vendor 107 of the software 109 and thekeymaster 113. The keymaster 113 is a trusted individual in anorganization. It will commonly be an individual that is regarded as apermanent employee, because the establishment of a new keymastercommonly involves reauthorization by the forensic investigation softwarevendor 107. During the hand shake authentication, the vendor 107generates an asymmetric key pair V_(priv) and V_(pub), comprising aprivate key and a public key respectively, and sends a certified copy ofV_(pub) to the keymaster 113. A certified copy is a copy that has beensigned by a certifying authority such as Verisign. Such a certifyingauthority will digitally sign the vendor's key thereby authenticatingthe vendor's identity to the keymaster 113. The keymaster 113 generatesan asymmetric key pair KM_(priv) and KM_(pub) and sends a copy ofKM_(pub) to the vendor 107. In step 603, the computer investigationsoftware 109 is installed on the server 111. In step 605, a setupprocess is executed in which the server 111 and the target machine 117are set up for secure communication. An embodiment of the setup processis further illustrated in FIG. 7. The servelet 403 is installed on thetarget machine 117, in step 607. Steps 601 through 607 are used toauthenticate the server 111 that is used to facilitate secureinvestigation of the target machine 117 by the client machine 115. Theserver 111 may then facilitate the secure investigation of any number oftarget machines.

FIG. 6B is a flow diagram of a computer investigation system inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention. In the presentembodiment, a unique machine dependent number is generated on the server111 which will be used for authenticating the communication between aclient machine 115 and a target machine 117, which will be the subjectof the forensic investigation. In step 609, the client machine 115establishes secure communication with the server 111. In establishingsecure communication the client machine 115 and the server 111 securelyexchange a first secret encryption key to facilitate securecommunication sessions between the auditor machine 115 and the targetmachine 117. In step 611, the server 111 and the target machine 117securely exchange a second secret encryption key to facilitate securecommunication sessions between the server 111 and the target machine117. After the client machine 115 and the server 111 establish securecommunication and the server 111 and the target machine 117 establishsecure communication, the server 111 then facilitates securecommunication between the client machine 115 and the target machine 117,step 613. Using the secure communication between the client machine 115and the target machine 117, the client machine 115 performs a secureinvestigation of the target machine 117 over the network 103, step 615.Steps 609 through 615 may be utilized any number of times to performsecure investigation of a plurality of target machines.

Secure communications are established between the machines in theenvironment 101 using a combination of asymmetric public key encryption,symmetric key encryption, and digital signatures. Computer data,including software objects, tokens, and encryption keys, are transmittedand received by machines over the network 103. To distinguish betweenthe various types of data, the following conventions are adopted herein:{ } encloses signed data; ( ) encloses asymmetrically encrypted data;and [ ] encloses symmetrically encrypted data.

In public key encryption, an asymmetric key pair is created, such keysare denoted using subscript notation. For example, KEY_(priv) is aprivate key and KEY_(pub) is a public key in the key pair named KEY.Using asymmetric encryption, data encrypted with a private key and canonly be decrypted by a party having the matching public key of the keypair. Similarly, data encrypted with a public key may only be decryptedby a party having the private key of the key pair. For example, theasymmetrical encryption of data named DATA by the private key KEY_(priv)is denoted as (DATA)KEY_(priv), where the name of the encrypted data isenclosed within the parentheses, and the key used to encrypt the data islocated immediately to the right of the closing right parentheses, inthis case KEY_(priv).

Using symmetric key encryption, data is encrypted and decrypted with asingle secret encryption key. For example, the symmetric encryption ofdata named DATA by the encryption key named KEY would be denoted as[DATA]KEY, where the name of the encrypted data is enclosed withinsquare brackets, and the key used to encrypt the data is locatedimmediately to the right of the closing right square bracket. Only thekey used to encrypt the data can be used to decrypt and access theencrypted data.

Transmitted data may also be electronically signed by a party byattaching an encrypted digital certificate to the transmitted data. Anencrypted digital certificate is commonly encrypted with the private keyof a key pair. A party with the matching public key can decrypt thedigital certificate and verify the identity of the sending party. Forexample, the signing of data named DATA using the encryption keyKEY_(priv) would be denoted as {DATA}KEY_(priv), where the name of thedata is enclosed within curly brackets, and the key used to sign thedata is located immediately to the right of the closing right curlybracket. Signed data is not encrypted and is therefore readable withouta key to decrypt the digital certificate. The identity of the partysending data may be determined by examining a signature attached to thedata. For example, data signed with KEY_(priv) may be verified by aparty having KEY_(pub). An encryption key is generally a large randomlygenerated number having certain determined properties.

FIG. 6C generally depicts an overview of a system embodying a securityprotocol, which is further described in FIGS. 8, 9, and 10.Communication between the client 115 and server 111 is generallyillustrated at 609, corresponding to block 609 in the flow chart of FIG.6A. Communication between the server 111 and the target is generallyillustrated at 613, corresponding to block 613 in the flowchart of FIG.6A. The overall communication from client 115 to server 111 to target117 back to client 115 is illustrated generally at 613, corresponding toclock 613 in the flowchart of FIG. 6A.

FIG. 7 is a sequence diagram of a setup process for the networkmachines, as illustrated in FIG. 1B, which are used for computerinvestigation, in accordance with an embodiment of the invention. Instep 703, The vendor 107 generates a key pair V_(priv) and V_(pub). Instep 705, the keymaster 113 generates a key pair KM_(priv) and KM_(pub).The keymaster 113 sends KM_(pub) to the vendor 107, in step 706. In step707, the server 111 generates MACHINE, which is a unique encryption keyderived using a machine specific number. In an exemplary embodiment thesize of MACHINE is 128 bits. However, MACHINE may be any suitablesymmetric encryption key. In an exemplary embodiment, the machinespecific number is generated by the server 111 from a hardwareconfiguration present in the server 111, such that the same number, i.e.the machine specific number, will be produced whenever the numbergeneration process is performed on the server 111. Steps 703 through 706may occur any time prior to step 707. Steps 707 onward may be initiatedby the server 111, which may then communicate with the vendor 107 in thecourse of the setup process. The server 111 generates a key pairSAFE_(priv) and SAFE_(pub), in step 709. SAFE is an acronym for secureauthorization for forensic examination used by Guidance Software ofPasadena, Calif. herein it denotes the secure mode upon which thecomputer investigation software 109 runs. In step 711, The server 111encrypts SAFE_(priv) with MACHINE and generates [SAFE_(priv)]MACHINE. Asdescribed above, the name [SAFE_(priv)]MACHINE indicates that the dataenclosed in square brackets, in this case the encryption keySAFE_(priv), has been symmetrically encrypted using MACHINE.[SAFE_(priv)]MACHINE is saved on the server 111 where it can be accessedby the server 111. The server 111 can generate MACHINE and decrypt[SAFE_(priv)]MACHINE to access and use the private key SAFE_(priv).Accordingly, SAFE_(priv) would be unrecoverable if the server 111 weredestroyed or disabled. In the event of such an event, a copy ofSAFE_(priv) is archived in a secure manner for use in a recoveryprocess. In step 715: the server 111 generates (MACHINE)SAFE_(pub) byasymmetrically encrypting MACHINE with SAFE_(pub); and SAFE_(pub) and(MACHINE)SAFE_(pub) are packaged together and encrypted by the server111 with V_(pub) to generate $\begin{pmatrix}{{SAFE}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{pmatrix}{V_{pub}.}$

The server 111 sends $\begin{pmatrix}{{SAFE}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{pmatrix}V_{pub}$

to the vendor 107 in step 717. The vendor 107 uses the private keyV_(priv) to decrypt $\begin{pmatrix}{{SAFE}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{pmatrix}V_{pub}$

and obtain SAFE_(pub) and (MACHINE)SAFE_(pub) in step 719. The vendor107 is unable to access MACHINE because the vendor 107 does not haveSAFE_(priv), the private key. The vendor 107, however, may copy the data(MACHINE)SAFE_(pub). In step 721: the vendor 107 packages KM_(pub) and(MACHINE)SAFE_(pub) together and signs the package with V_(priv) togenerate ${\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}{Vpriv}};$

and the vendor 107 encrypts $\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}{Vpriv}$

with SAFE_(pub) to generate $\left( {\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}V_{priv}} \right){{SAFE}_{pub}.}$

The vendor 107 sends $\left( {\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}V_{priv}} \right){SAFE}_{pub}$

to the server 111 in step 723. The vendor 107 signs SAFE_(pub) withV_(priv) to generate {SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) in step 725. In step 727, thevendor 107 sends {SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) to the server 111. In step 729,the server 111 may distribute {SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) and send{SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) to the target machine 117. In step 731, the server111 generates the number MACHINE. The server 111 uses MACHINE to decryptthe archived data [SAFE_(priv)]MACHINE and access SAFE_(priv). In step733: the server 111 decrypts $\left( {\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}V_{priv}} \right){SAFE}_{pub}$

using SAFE_(priv), thereby accessing ${\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}{Vpriv}};$

the server 111 verifies the contents of $\begin{Bmatrix}{{KM}_{pub}} \\{{({MACHINE}){SAFE}_{pub}}}\end{Bmatrix}{Vpriv}$

using public key V_(pub); and the server 111 decrypts(MACHINE)SAFE_(pub) using SAFE_(priv) to access MACHINE. In step 735,the server 111 verifies the decrypted number MACHINE against the numberMACHINE generated on the server 111 to verify that the communicationwith the vendor 107 has been made without being spoofed by a thirdparty. The server 111 then has the public key KM_(pub), which was sentby the vendor 107. In step 736, the server 111 encrypts SAFE_(priv) withKM_(pub) to generate (SAFE_(priv))KM_(pub). (SAFE_(priv))KM_(pub) may bearchived onto a remote data storage device separate from the server 111as part of a disaster recovery measure. Such a remote storage locationmay be a separate server, personal computer, disk, or other storagedevice. In the event of such a destruction or disabling of the server111, the archived copy of (SAFE_(priv))KM_(pub) may be accessed only bythe keymaster 113 with KM_(priv) to recover SAFE_(priv). Byasymmetrically encrypting SAFE_(priv) with the keymaster's public key,KM_(pub), only the keymaster 113 using the associated private key,KM_(priv), can decrypt the data and access SAFE_(priv). After the setupprocess of FIG. 7, SAFE_(priv) need not be maintained on the server 111.The target machine 117 verifies the signature of {SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) bythe vendor 107 in step 737, and has the public key SAFE_(pub).

In an exemplary recovery process, the server 111 is unavailable for useand a setup process is performed on a second server. In order to avoidgenerating a new asymmetric server key pair and repeating the computerinvestigation setup, authentication, and communication processes, it isdesirable to retrieve and use the archived copy of SAFE_(priv). Thesecond server retrieves the archived copy of (SAFE_(priv))KM_(pub), forexample, from an archive floppy, drive, or other archival storage. Thesecond server receives KM_(priv) from the keymaster 113, or otherwisehas (SAFE_(priv))KM_(pub) decrypted by the keymaster 113. Havingobtained access to SAFE_(priv), authentication of the second server isperformed using steps similar to steps 711 through 736 using the secondserver. Since the second server is a different machine than the server111, the second server generates MACHINE2, which is different fromMACHINE. MACHINE2 is a second unique encryption key derived using asecond machine specific number. MACHINE2 may be used in a similar manneras described in connection with FIG. 7, such as securely storingSAFE_(priv) on the second server. One purpose of performing these stepsusing the second server is to authenticate the second server to thevendor to help prevent unauthorized parties from using the computerinvestigation software.

FIG. 8 is a sequence diagram for establishing secure communicationbetween the client machine 115 and the server 111 in accordance with anembodiment of the invention. In step 805, the client machine 115generates a random number Crand. In an exemplary embodiment, Crand is a128 bit number. In step 807: the client machine 115 packages Crand andNAME and signs the package with CLIENT_(priv) to create {Crand,NAME}CLIENT_(priv); and the client machine 115 encrypts {Crand,NAME}CLIENT_(priv) with SAFE_(pub) to generate ({Crand,NAME}CLIENT_(priv)) SAFE_(pub). In step 809, the client machine 115sends ({Crand, NAME}CLIENT_(priv)) SAFE_(pub) to the server 111. Theserver 111 verifies the identity of the client machine 115. The server111 decrypts ({Crand, NAME}CLIENT_(priv))SAFE_(pub) with SAFE_(priv) instep 815. The server 111 uses NAME to look up the sender's public keyand verify the signature of {Crand, NAME}CLIENT_(priv). In this examplesequence, NAME would include the identity of the client machine 115, andthe server 111 would look up the public key of the client machine 115,CLIENT_(pub), in a public key directory. The server 111 generates twoadditional random numbers, Srand and SCkey as illustrated in step 817.In step 819: the server 111 packages Crand, Srand, and SCkey and signsthe package with SAFE_(priv); and the server 111 generates ({Crand,Srand, SCkey}SAFE_(priv))CLIENT_(pub) by encrypting the signed packagewith CLIENT_(pub). Therefore, only the client machine 115, having theprivate key CLIENT_(priv), will be able to decrypt ({Crand, Srand,SCkey}SAFE_(priv))CLIENT_(pub). The server 111 sends ({Crand, Srand,SCkey}SAFE_(priv))CLIENT_(pub) 821 to the client machine 115. The clientmachine 115 decrypts ({Crand, Srand, SCkey}SAFE_(priv))CLIENT_(pub)using CLIENT_(priv) in step 823. The client machine 115 verifies thesignature of {Crand, Srand, SCkey}SAFE_(priv) in step 825 using thepublic key SAFE_(pub) and also verifies that Crand is the same randomnumber that the client machine 115 generated in step 805. The clientmachine 115 symmetrically encrypts Srand with the session key SCkey,that was generated by the server 111 at 817, to generate [Srand]SCkey instep 827. The client machine 115 sends [Srand]SCkey to the server 111 instep 829. In step 833, the server 111 uses SCkey to decrypt [Srand]SCkeyand access Srand. In step 835, the server 111 verifies that the randomnumber Srand is the same number that the server 111 generated and sentto the client machine 115 in steps 817 and 821. Verification of Srandhelps to ensure that the communication has not been spoofed by a thirdparty and also helps to verify that the communication between the clientmachine 115 and the server 111 is timely. Timeliness of allcommunications in the computer investigation system may be determinedusing timeouts. An expected response will not be accepted as valid if itis not received in a predetermined amount of time. One purpose of thecommunication between the client machine 115 and the server 111 is toauthenticate the client machine 115 to the server 111 and toauthenticate the server 111 to the client machine 115, thereby verifyingthe identities of the two parties which are communicating. Anotherpurpose of the communication between the client machine 115 and theserver 111 is to securely exchange symmetric key SCkey that can be usedfor secure communication as a session key. The client machine 115 andthe server 111 both now have the shared, secret encryption key SCkey touse in sending symmetrically encrypted messages.

The process illustrated in FIG. 8 may be conducted between the server111 and any number of client machines. In one embodiment of theinvention, the keymaster 113 is a first client who is authenticated withthe server 111. In the case of the first client authentication with theserver, the asymmetric key pair CLIENT_(priv) and CLIENT_(pub) issynonymous with the asymmetric key pair KM_(priv) and KM_(pub). In thecomputer investigation system setup of FIG. 7, KM_(pub) is securely sentto the server 111. Therefore, the server 111 may decrypt data that isencrypted with KM_(priv). Accordingly, the process illustrated in FIG. 8may be used between the keymaster 113 and the server 111 to establish asecure method of communication between the keymaster 113 and the server111. Thereafter, other users may generate additional asymmetric keypairs which may be used by their client machines to establish securecommunication with the server 111. In an exemplary embodiment, thekeymaster 113 sends the user's public key to the server 111 while theuser keeps the associated private key on the client machine, which mayuse the associated private key to perform the communication processillustrated in FIG. 8. Accordingly, after the keymaster 113 hasestablished secure communication with the server 111, the keymaster 113may provide for any number of client machines to communicate with theserver 111.

FIG. 9 is a sequence diagram for establishing a secure system ofcommunication between the server 111 and the target machine 117 inaccordance with an embodiment of the invention. The server 111 generatesa second random number Srand2 in step 901. The server 111 signs Srand2with SAFE_(priv) to generate {Srand2}SAFE_(priv) in step 903. The server111 sends {Srand2}SAFE_(priv) 905 to the target machine 729 in step 905.From the sequence described in FIG. 7, the target machine 117 receives{SAFE_(pub)}V_(priv) from the vendor 107 signed with the vendor'sprivate key V_(priv). Therefore, the target machine 117 has the publickey SAFE_(pub) with some assurance that a communication signed with thematching private key SAFE_(priv) has been authorized by the vendor 107.The target machine 117 uses SAFE_(pub) to verify the signature of{Srand2}SAFE_(priv) in step 907. The target machine 117 generates arandom number NSrand in step 909. The target machine 117 packages NSrandand Srand2 together and encrypts the packaged data with SAFE_(pub) togenerate (NSrand, Srand2)SAFE_(pub) in step 911. The target machine 117sends (NSrand, Srand2)SAFE_(pub) to the server 111 in step 913. Theserver 111 uses SAFE_(priv) to decrypt (NSrand, Srand2)SAFE_(pub) instep 915. The server 111, in step 917, verifies that the number Srand2is the same random number that the server 111 generated and sent to thetarget machine 117 in steps 903 and 905. The server 111 generatesanother random number SNkey 919. The server 111 symmetrically encryptsSNkey with NSkey to generate [SNkey]NSkey in step 921. The server 111sends [SNkey]NSkey to the target machine 117 in step 923. The targetmachine 117 uses NSkey to decrypt [SNkey]NSkey and access Snkey in step925. The server 111 and the target machine 117 both now have the shared,secret encryption key SNkey to use in sending symmetrically encryptedmessages.

The security of symmetric key encryption is directly related to thequality of the random number generator used to generate a symmetricencryption key. Therefore, in the above sequence, symmetric key SNkey isgenerated by the server 111 and securely sent to the target machine 117.It is difficult to guarantee the quality of the random number generatedat the target machine 117. Therefore, the random number generated by thetarget machine 117 at step 909 is used for only one communication withthe server 111 to decrease the possibility that a communicationencrypted with NSrand, the random number generated by the target machine117, may be intercepted by a third party. The server 111 requestscommunication with the target machine 117 at the request of the clientmachine 115.

FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram for establishing a secure system ofcommunication between the client machine 115 and the target machine 117,in accordance with an embodiment of the invention. The client machine115 packages NODENAME and PORT and symmetrically encrypts the packageddata with the session key SCkey to generate [NODENAME, PORT]SCkey instep 1001. NODENAME is the IP address or other identification of thetarget machine 117. PORT is the identification of a port that the clientmachine 115 will use to communicate with the target machine 117. Theclient machine 115 sends [NODENAME, PORT]SCkey to the server 111 in step1003. The server 111 generates a session key CNkey in step 1005. Theserver 111 packages the CNkey, IPCLIENT, and PORT and encrypts thepackaged data with the SNkey to generate [CNkey, IPCLIENT, PORT]SNkey instep 1007. IP CLIENT is an IP address of the client machine 115. Theserver 111 sends [CNkey, IPCLIENT, PORT]SNkey to the target machine 117in step 1009. The target machine 117 uses SNkey to decrypt [CNkey,IPCLIENT, PORT]SNkey in step 1011. The server 111 packages CNkey andIPNODE and encrypts the packaged data with the session key SCkey togenerate [CNkey, IPNODE]SCkey in step 1013. IPNODE is an IP address ofthe target machine 117. The server 111 sends [CNkey, IPNODE]SCkey 1015to the client machine 115. The client machine 115 uses SCkey to decrypt[CNkey, IPNODE]SCkey in step 1017 and access CNKey and IPNODE. Theclient machine 115 listens on PORT and waits for a communication fromthe target machine 117 in step 1019. The target machine 117symmetrically encrypts IPNODE with the session key CNkey to generate[IPNODE]CNkey in step 1021. The target machine 117 sends [IPNODE]CNkeyto the client machine 115 in step 1023. The client machine 115 usesCNkey to decrypt [IPNODE]CNkey to access IPNODE in step 1025. In step1027, the client machine 115 verifies that the address IPNODE receivedfrom the target machine 117 matches the address IPNODE received from theserver 111 in step 1015. The above sequence provides both the clientmachine 115 and the target machine 117 with a session key SCkey that wasgenerated by the server 111. The client machine 115 and the targetmachine 117 can communicate with symmetrically encrypted messages usingthe session key CNkey.

FIG. 11 is a sequence diagram for secure communication between theclient machine 115 and the target machine 117 in accordance with anembodiment of the invention. The client machine 115 encrypts a messagefor the target machine 117 using CNkey in step 1101. The client machine115 sends the encrypted message to the server 111 in step 1103. Theserver 111 verifies the permissions of the client machine 115 in step1105. The server 111 continually oversees the communication between theclient machine 115 and the target machine 117. Messages from the clientmachine 115 to the target machine 117 are sent through the server 111 toensure that the client machine 115 has permission to take the requestedaction. The server 111 may also check and log any suspicious activity,such as failed log-on attempts by the client machine 115, unauthorizedaction taken, time spent accessing the target machine 117, and any otheractivity taken by the client machine 115 in communication with thetarget machine 117. In step 1107, the server 111 sends the encryptedmessage to the target machine 117. In step 1109, the target machine 117verifies the message sent by the client machine 115 through the server111 by decrypting the message with the session key CNkey. In step 1111,the target machine 117 encrypts a second message for transmission to theclient machine 115. In step 1113, the target machine 117 sends thesecond message to the client machine 115. In step 1115, the clientmachine 115 verifies the second message sent by the target machine 117by decrypting the second message with the session key CNkey.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the above investigationsystem may be implemented in a variety of configurations. For example,the secure systems of communication are not restricted to thosecommunications among a server, target machine, and client machine, butmay be implemented between multiple machines performing any variety offunctions. Additionally, it will be apparent to those of ordinary skillin the art that the network may include multiple target machines and theclient machine may simultaneously investigate multiple machines on anetwork by implementing the above investigation system in paralleloperation.

In an exemplary embodiment of the invention, an investigation programuses the computer investigation system to perform the investigation ofthe target machine 117. The investigation program executes routines orcomputer operations that may be written using a programming language,scripting language, macro language, or other executable instructions.The investigation program may be executed on the client machine 115which in turn performs executed operations on the target machine 117.Using executable routines, the investigation provides for specific,complex, and efficient searches to be performed on the target machinewhile minimizing or eliminating damage to the target machine beingsearched.

In one embodiment, the investigation program helps to prevent any dataon the target machine from being altered or changed by controlling thetypes of routines that may be performed. For example, the investigationprogram may be programmed not to execute a routine that would changedata important in the computer investigation. The investigation programmay perform any operations supported by the particular routines beingused. For example, the investigation program may view files on thetarget drive, copy and acquire date from the target drive, perform textsearches, perform hash value searches, establish hash categories for usein searching, perform file signature searches, create compressed copiesof the target drive, search file extensions, search file paths, searchtime stamps, search the registry, search compressed files, decompressand decode files, search using grep (generalized regular expressionparser) commands, and the like.

The previous description of the exemplary embodiments is provided toenable any person skilled in the art to make or use the presentinvention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readilyapparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles definedherein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from thespirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is notintended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to beaccorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novelfeatures disclosed herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of examining a storage device coupled toa target machine in a communications network the method comprising:installing a servelet on the target machine; transmitting securecommands to the servelet over the communications network to retrievedata from the storage device, comprising: establishing securecommunications between the client machine and an intermediate node,comprising: generating, by the intermediate node, of a first encryptionkey; and transmitting the first encryption key, by the intermediatenode, to the client machine; generating, by the client machine, of anauthentication key; and authenticating, by the client machine, theintermediate node using the authentication key; establishing securecommunications between the intermediate node and the target machine; andestablishing secure communications between the client machine and thetarget machine; using the servelet to retrieve data from the storagedevice; receiving data from the servelet over the communicationsnetwork; and storing the retrieved data on a client machine.
 2. A methodof examining a storage device coupled to a target machine in acommunications network the method comprising: installing a servelet onthe target machine; transmitting secure commands to the servelet overthe communications network to retrieve data from the storage device,comprising: establishing secure communications between the clientmachine and an intermediate node, comprising: generating, by theintermediate node, of a first encryption key; and transmitting the firstencryption key, by the intermediate node, to the client machine;establishing secure communications between the intermediate node and thetarget machine, comprising: generating, by the target machine, of asecond encryption key; transmitting the second encryption key, by thetarget machine, to the intermediate node; generating, by theintermediate node, of a third encryption key; transmitting the thirdencryption key to the target machine, wherein the third encryption keyis encrypted by the intermediate node using the second encryption key;and decrypting, by the target machine, of the third encryption key usingthe second encryption key; establishing secure communications betweenthe client machine and the target machine; using the servelet toretrieve data from the storage device; receiving data from the serveletover the communications network; and storing the retrieved data on aclient machine.
 3. The method of claim 2 further comprising: generating,by the intermediate node, an authentication key; and authenticating, bythe intermediate node, the target machine using the authentication key.4. The method of claim 2, wherein establishing secure communicationsbetween the client machine and the target machine comprises: generating,by the intermediate node, of a fourth encryption key; transmitting thefourth encryption key to the target machine, wherein the intermediatenode encrypts the fourth encryption key using the third encryption key;decrypting, by the target machine, of the fourth encryption key usingthe third encryption key; transmitting, by the intermediate node, to theclient machine of the fourth encryption key, wherein the intermediatenode encrypts the fourth encryption key using the first encryption key;and decrypting by the client machine of the fourth encryption key usingthe first encryption key.
 5. The method of claim 4 further comprising:transmitting, by the intermediate node, to the client machine of atarget machine network address; transmitting, by the target machine, tothe client machine of the target machine network address; andauthenticating, by the client machine, of the target machine using thetarget machine network addresses.
 6. A method for secure forensicinvestigation of a target machine by a client machine over acommunications network the method comprising: establishing securecommunication with a server over a communications network; establishingsecure communication with the target machine over the communicationsnetwork, wherein establishing secure communication with the targetmachine includes establishing secure communication between the serverand the target machine; installing a servelet on the target machine;transmitting a secure command to the servelet over the communicationsnetwork; executing the secure command in the servelet; transmittingdata, by the target machine, in response to a servelet instruction; andreceiving the data from the target machine over the communicationnetwork; wherein establishing secure communication with the servercomprises receiving from the server of a first encryption key, whereinthe server generates the first encryption key; wherein establishingsecure communication between the server and the target machinecomprises: generating, by the target machine, of a second encryptionkey; transmitting the second encryption key to the server; generating bythe server of a third encryption key; transmitting the third encryptionkey to the target machine, wherein the third encryption key is encryptedby the server using the second encryption key; and decrypting by thetarget machine of the third encryption key using the second encryptionkey.
 7. The method of claim 6, wherein establishing secure communicationwith the target machine further comprise comprises: generating, by theserver, of a fourth encryption key; receiving, from the server, thefourth encryption key, wherein the server encrypts the received fourthencryption key using the first encryption key; decrypting the receivedfourth encryption key using the first encryption key; transmitting, bythe server, to the target machine of the fourth encryption key, whereinthe server encrypts the transmitted fourth encryption key using thethird encryption key; and decrypting, by the target machine, of thetransmitted fourth encryption key using the third encryption key.
 8. Asystem for secure forensic investigation over a communication networkcomprising: a target machine coupled to the communication network, thetarget machine coupled to a storage device; a client machine coupled tothe communications network, the client machine configured to investigatethe target machine over the communications network; and an intermediatenode coupled to the communications network, wherein the intermediatenode is configured to facilitate secure communication between the clientmachine and the target machine over the communications network; aservelet coupled to the target machine, wherein the servelet isconfigured to receive data from the client machine over thecommunication network, the servelet further configured to transmit datato the client machine over the communication network, wherein the clientmachine includes a second storage device, the second storage deviceconfigured to store the transmitted data; a first encryption keygenerated by the intermediate node; a second encryption key generated bythe intermediate node; and a third encryption key generated by theintermediate node, wherein the first encryption key is configured tosecurely transmit the third encryption key to the client machine, andwherein the second encryption key is configured to securely transmit thethird encryption key to the target machine.
 9. An apparatus forexamining a storage device coupled to a target machine in acommunications network including a client machine, the client machinecomprising: a network coupling configured to communicate using thecommunications network; a memory coupled to the network coupling; aprocessor coupled to the memory, the processor configured to install aservelet on the target machine, the processor further configured tocommand the servelet over the communications network, retrieve data fromthe storage device using the servelet, receive data from the serveletover the communications network, and store the retrieved data on thememory; wherein commanding the servelet comprises transmitting securecommands to the servelet over the communications network; anintermediate node coupled to the data communications network, whereinthe intermediate node is configured to establish secure communicationsbetween the client machine and the intermediate node, wherein theintermediate node is further configured to establish securecommunications between the intermediate node and the target machine andthe intermediate node is further configured to establish securecommunications between the client machine and the target machine;wherein the intermediate node is further configured to generate a firstencryption key and transmit the first encryption key to the clientmachine; wherein the processor of the client machine is furtherconfigured to generate an authentication key and authenticate the clientmachine to the intermediate node using the authentication key.
 10. Anapparatus for examining a storage device coupled to a target machine ina communications network including a client machine, the client machinecomprising: a network coupling configured to communicate using thecommunications network; a memory coupled to the network coupling; aprocessor coupled to the memory, the processor configured to install aservelet on the target machine, the processor further configured tocommand the servelet over the communications network, retrieve data fromthe storage device using the servelet, receive data from the serveletover the communications network, and store the retrieved data on thememory; wherein commanding the servelet comprises transmitting securecommands to the servelet over the communications network; anintermediate node coupled to the data communications network, whereinthe intermediate node is configured to establish secure communicationsbetween the client machine and the intermediate node, wherein theintermediate node is further configured to establish securecommunications between the intermediate node and the target machine andthe intermediate node is further configured to establish securecommunications between the client machine and the target machine;wherein the intermediate node is further configured to generate a firstencryption key and transmit the first encryption key to the clientmachine; wherein in order to establish secure communications between theintermediate node and the target machine, the intermediate node isfurther configured to: receive a second encryption key, wherein thesecond encryption key is generated by the target machine; generate athird encryption key; and transmit the third encryption key to thetarget machine, wherein the third encryption key is encrypted by theintermediate node using the second encryption key, and wherein theencrypted third encryption key is configured to be decrypted by thetarget machine using the second encryption key.
 11. The apparatus ofclaim 10, wherein the intermediate node is further configured togenerate an authentication key and authenticate the target machine usingthe authentication key.
 12. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein in orderto establish secure communications between the client machine and thetarget machine, the intermediate node is further configured to: generatea fourth encryption key; transmit the fourth encryption key to thetarget machine, wherein the fourth encryption key transmitted to thetarget machine is encrypted by the intermediate node using the thirdencryption key; and transmit the fourth encryption key to the clientmachine, wherein the fourth encryption key transmitted to the clientmachine is encrypted by the intermediate node using the first encryptionkey.
 13. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the client machine isfurther configured to: receive a first target machine network address(TMNA) from the intermediate node; receive a second TMNA from the clientmachine; and authenticate the target machine by comparing the first TMNAto the second TMNA.
 14. An apparatus for secure forensic investigationof a target machine over a communications network the apparatuscomprising: a network coupling configured to communicate using thecommunications network; a memory coupled to the network coupling; aprocessor coupled to the memory, the processor configured to: establishsecure communication with a server over a communications network;establish secure communication with the target machine over thecommunications network, wherein secure communication with the targetmachine includes secure communication between the server and the targetmachine; install a servelet on the target machine; transmit a securecommand to the servelet over the communications network; execute thesecure command using the servelet; receive data from the target machine,wherein the data is received from the servelet; receive a firstencryption key from the server, wherein the first encryption key isgenerated by the server; wherein to establish secure communicationbetween the server and the target machine, the server is configured toreceive a second encryption key from the target machine, wherein thesecond encryption key is generated by the target machine, the serverfurther configured to generate a third encryption key, and transmit thethird encryption key to the target machine, wherein the third encryptionkey is encrypted by the server using the second encryption key.
 15. Theapparatus of claim 14, wherein in order to establish securecommunication with the target machine, the processor is furtherconfigured to receive a fourth encryption key from the server, whereinthe fourth encryption key is encrypted by the server using the firstencryption key, the processor further configured to decrypt the receivedfourth encryption key using the first encryption key.
 16. The apparatusof claim 15, wherein the server is further configured to transmit thefourth encryption key to the target machine, wherein the fourthencryption key transmitted to the target machine is encrypted by theserver using the third encryption key, and wherein the transmittedfourth encryption key is configured to be decrypted by the targetmachine using the third encryption key.